[Information Sharing] The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Has Issued the “Emergency Response Plan for African Swine Fever Outbreaks (Sixth Edition)”

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs

To ensure more scientific and precise management of African swine fever outbreaks and to strengthen routine prevention and control measures, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has, in light of recent prevention and control practices and the current epidemic situation, formulated the “Emergency Response Plan for African Swine Fever Outbreaks (Sixth Edition),” which is hereby issued for implementation. The “Emergency Response Plan for African Swine Fever Outbreaks (Fifth Edition)” is hereby repealed.

Emergency Response Plan for African Swine Fever

(Sixth Edition)

African swine fever is a major animal epidemic; once it breaks out, the mortality rate is high, making it the greatest threat to the production safety of China’s hog industry. To wage a sustained and effective battle against African swine fever, to genuinely safeguard the stable and healthy development of the pig-raising sector, and to ensure an adequate supply of pork products, this plan is formulated in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and provisions, including the Animal Epidemic Prevention Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Quarantine of Animals and Plants at Borders, the Biosecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Emergency Regulations on Major Animal Epidemics, and the National Emergency Plan for Major Animal Epidemics.

I. Epidemic Reporting and Confirmation

Any organization or individual that discovers suspected clinical signs of African swine fever in live pigs, or instances of abnormal mortality, shall immediately report such findings to the local agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) administrative authority or to the animal disease prevention and control agency. Upon receipt of such reports, the relevant authorities shall promptly implement the necessary measures as prescribed and submit the required information, and shall determine and report outbreaks in accordance with the sequence “suspected outbreak—probable outbreak—confirmed outbreak.”

(1) Suspicious Outbreak

Upon receipt of such information, animal disease prevention and control agencies at or above the county level shall immediately dispatch two personnel holding intermediate-level or higher technical titles to the site to promptly implement necessary measures, including temporary isolation and containment, disinfection, on-site diagnosis, and epidemiological investigation. Where a case meets the criteria for a suspected case as set forth in the “Diagnostic Standards for African Swine Fever” (Appendix 1; hereinafter referred to as the “Standards”), it shall be designated as a suspected case, with timely sampling and submission for testing, and the case shall be reported to the competent agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the local people’s government at the same level for official confirmation.

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at or above the county level shall, based on on-site diagnostic results and epidemiological investigation information, designate cases that meet the criteria for suspected cases as suspected outbreaks.

(2) Suspected Epidemic

When nucleic acid of the African swine fever virus is detected in samples from suspected cases by a laboratory of an animal disease prevention and control institution at or above the county level, or by a third-party laboratory accredited by the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the people’s government at the provincial level, such cases shall be designated as suspected cases; the samples shall be promptly submitted for re-examination, and the designation shall be reported to the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the local people’s government at or above the county level for confirmation.

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at or above the county level shall, based on laboratory test results and epidemiological investigation information, designate cases that meet the criteria for suspected cases as suspected outbreaks.

(3) Confirmed Epidemic

If, upon re-examination by a provincial-level animal disease prevention and control institution or by a prefecture-level animal disease prevention and control laboratory authorized by the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) administrative department of the provincial people’s government, nucleic acid of the African swine fever virus is detected in samples from suspected cases, such cases shall be classified as confirmed cases and promptly reported to the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) administrative department of the provincial people’s government for verification. Provincial-level animal disease prevention and control institutions that are so equipped shall, in accordance with the requirements of the “Standard,” conduct targeted pathogen differentiation testing.

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments at the provincial level shall, based on the confirmed diagnosis and epidemiological investigation information, designate cases that meet the criteria for confirmed cases as confirmed outbreaks; outbreaks in epidemic areas or threatened areas that span two or more provinces shall be designated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

(4) Epidemic Reporting and Disclosure

Upon confirmation of an outbreak, the provincial animal disease prevention and control agency in the area where the outbreak has been confirmed shall, in accordance with the requirements for rapid outbreak reporting, submit the relevant information to the China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center and dispatch samples and epidemiological investigation data to the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center. The China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center shall, in accordance with established procedures, report the outbreak information to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. Following the Ministry’s statutory reporting and notification of the outbreak, the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the people’s government of the province where the outbreak occurred shall release the outbreak information. No other organizations or individuals may release information on outbreaks or on the clearance of outbreaks.

Relevant authorities shall promptly maintain records for future reference when conducting epidemic reporting, investigations, and activities such as sample collection, submission for testing, and laboratory analysis.

Any African swine fever outbreak detected during the transportation of live pigs shall be reported and handled by the authority in the locality where the outbreak is identified, and the outbreak shall be recorded under the jurisdiction of the pig-exporting locality.

Animal epidemic prevention and control agencies at or above the county level in the area where an outbreak has been confirmed shall, in accordance with the requirements for rapid outbreak reporting, submit follow-up reports and final reports through each tier of the reporting hierarchy; the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s government of the province where the outbreak occurred shall promptly report to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on significant developments in outbreak management and on the summary of such efforts.

II. Pandemic Response

Based on the epidemiological characteristics, severity of harm, and scope of impact of African swine fever, the emergency response to outbreaks is classified into four levels.

(1) Extraordinarily Major (Level I) Epidemic Response

When outbreaks occur in most provinces within a 21-day period, with new outbreaks continuing to increase and spread rapidly, thereby posing a serious threat to the development of the hog industry and to the functioning of the economy and society, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, based on the epidemic situation and the results of risk assessments, shall submit a request to the State Council to activate a Level I response to the outbreak and to convene the national emergency command mechanism; alternatively, with authorization from the State Council, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs may itself activate a Level I response and take the lead in establishing an inter-agency emergency command mechanism, under which all relevant departments shall, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, work together to carry out epidemic prevention and control.

Upon activation of a Level I epidemic response, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs shall be responsible for issuing epidemic alerts to the public. People’s governments at or above the county level shall immediately activate their emergency command mechanisms, organize all relevant departments to carry out epidemic response in accordance with their respective duties, implement a daily reporting system for prevention and control efforts, conduct emergency epidemiological investigations and surveillance, and promptly adopt emergency response measures upon detection of any outbreak.

(II) Major (Level II) Epidemic Response

When outbreaks occur in more than nine provinces within 21 days and there is a trend of further spread, a Level II epidemic response shall be activated.

People’s governments at or above the county level in areas affected by the epidemic shall immediately activate their emergency command mechanisms and organize relevant departments to jointly respond to the epidemic in accordance with their respective responsibilities; implement a daily reporting system for prevention and control efforts; conduct emergency epidemiological investigations and surveillance; and promptly adopt emergency response measures upon detection of any outbreak.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has strengthened its assessment of the national epidemic situation, conducted supervisory inspections of emergency response efforts in provinces where outbreaks have occurred, dispatched expert teams as needed to provide guidance on outbreak management, issued public alerts, and provided guidance on effective epidemic response.

(3) Major (Level III) Epidemic Response

A Level III epidemic response shall be activated when an outbreak occurs in more than four but fewer than eight provinces within a 21-day period, or when outbreaks occur in three adjacent provinces.

The people’s governments at the city and county levels in the areas where the epidemic has occurred shall immediately activate their emergency command mechanisms, organize relevant departments to jointly carry out epidemic response in accordance with their respective responsibilities, implement a daily reporting system for prevention and control efforts, conduct urgent epidemiological investigations and emergency surveillance, and promptly adopt emergency response measures upon detection of any outbreak.

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the provincial people’s government in the area where the outbreak has occurred shall conduct oversight and guidance on emergency response measures in the affected area, organize experts to provide technical support as needed, notify relevant regions and departments within the province of outbreak information, and provide guidance on effective epidemic response.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has issued an early warning to the relevant provinces.

(4) General (Level IV) Epidemic Response

A Level IV epidemic response shall be activated if outbreaks occur in fewer than three provinces within 21 days.

The people’s government at the county level in the area where the outbreak occurs shall immediately activate the emergency command mechanism, organize relevant departments to jointly respond to the epidemic in accordance with their respective responsibilities, implement a daily reporting system for prevention and control efforts, conduct urgent epidemiological investigations and emergency surveillance, and promptly adopt emergency response measures upon detection of any outbreak.

The municipal people’s government’s department in charge of agriculture and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary medicine) in the area where the outbreak has occurred shall conduct oversight and guidance on emergency response measures at the outbreak site and promptly organize experts to provide technical support; it shall also notify the relevant counties, districts, and departments within the municipality of outbreak information and provide guidance on effective epidemic response.

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments at the provincial level shall, as necessary, provide technical support for epidemic response and issue early warning information to the relevant regions.

(5) Refinement and Adjustment of Emergency Response Measures Across Regions

Provincial people’s governments or emergency command agencies shall, in light of the actual conditions within their jurisdictions, scientifically formulate and refine tiered emergency response standards and response measures, and provide guidance to city- and county-level authorities to ensure that these are clearly defined and effectively implemented at each successive level. In principle, the tiered emergency response standards and response measures established by local authorities shall not be lower than the national standards and measures. Prior to downgrading the emergency response level, the provincial people’s government or the relevant emergency command agency shall require the provincial department in charge of agriculture and rural affairs (including animal husbandry and veterinary services) to promptly submit a report on the relevant circumstances to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs for record-keeping.

(6) Adjustment of the National-Level Emergency Response Level

Based on the epidemic situation and actual prevention and control measures, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs shall organize assessment and analysis, and promptly submit recommendations or opinions for adjusting the response level or terminating the emergency response; the people’s government or emergency command agency that originally activated the response mechanism shall then adjust the response level or terminate the emergency response.

III. Emergency Response

For premises where suspicious or suspected outbreaks have occurred, the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s government at the county level in the locality, together with the people’s governments of the relevant townships, shall immediately organize and implement measures such as quarantine and observation, sample collection and testing, epidemiological investigation, restrictions on the entry and exit of susceptible animals and related materials, and environmental disinfection. Where necessary, measures such as lockdowns and culling may be adopted.

Upon confirmation of an outbreak, the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at or above the county level shall immediately delineate the disease focus, the epidemic area, and the threatened area, and submit a proposal to the people’s government at the same level to activate the corresponding level of emergency response; the decision shall be made by the people’s government at that level in accordance with the law. Where the scope of impact involves two or more administrative regions, the delineation shall be carried out by the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the common higher-level people’s government of the relevant administrative regions, or jointly by the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the higher-level people’s governments of each relevant administrative region.

When designating an outbreak site, consideration should be given to factors such as the biosecurity level of the premises where the affected pigs are located and the implementation of disease prevention and control measures. In delineating the epidemic area and the threatened area, factors such as natural barriers (e.g., rivers, mountain ranges), artificial barriers (e.g., roads, fences), administrative boundaries, pig stocking density and rearing conditions, the layout of pig production facilities (e.g., slaughterhouses, trading venues), and the distribution of wild boars should be taken into account. Following a comprehensive assessment of the risk of disease transmission, these areas should be appropriately demarcated.

(1) Designation and Management of Disease Outbreak Sites

1. Designation of the outbreak site. For large-scale pig farms that maintain a high level of biosecurity, if the housing unit housing the affected pigs is effectively isolated from other housing units, that housing unit may be designated as the outbreak site; if the housing unit housing the affected pigs is not effectively isolated from other housing units, the entire farm shall be designated as the outbreak site, or alternatively, the housing unit housing the affected pigs together with any epidemiologically linked housing units shall be designated as the outbreak site.

For other farms (households), the outbreak site shall be the farm (household) where the affected pigs are located; if cross-contamination has already occurred or there is a risk of such contamination, the outbreak sites shall include both the farm (household) where the affected pigs are located and any epidemiologically linked farms (households).

For live pigs raised in confinement, the premises where the diseased pigs were housed shall be designated as the outbreak site.

Where an outbreak is detected during transportation, the vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other means of transport carrying the infected live pigs shall be designated as the outbreak site.

When an outbreak occurs in a live pig trading or quarantine facility, that facility shall be designated as the epidemic focus.

In the event of an outbreak at a slaughterhouse (or slaughter facility), the outbreak site shall be defined as the slaughterhouse (or slaughter facility) itself, excluding any meat-processing workshops and cold-storage facilities that have not been contaminated by the virus.

2. Measures to be taken. People’s governments at the county level shall, in accordance with the law and in a timely manner, organize the culling of all live pigs within the outbreak site and, in compliance with the Technical Specifications for the Harmless Treatment of Dead and Diseased Animals and other relevant regulations, carry out harmless treatment of all dead and culled pigs and their products, as well as their excreta, kitchen waste, contaminated or potentially contaminated feed and bedding, and wastewater. In accordance with the Disinfection Standards for African Swine Fever (Appendix 2) and other relevant requirements, strict disinfection shall be conducted on personnel, vehicles, equipment, pigsties, premises, and other items that have been or may have been contaminated, and measures to control vector organisms, such as fly and rodent control, shall be strengthened. The import of live pigs and the export of live pigs and their products shall be prohibited. Where the outbreak site is a pig slaughterhouse (or facility), pig-slaughtering and other production and business activities shall also be suspended, and epidemiologically linked vehicles shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. If an outbreak is detected during transport, the transport vehicle shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected, and no return of the vehicle shall be permitted.

(II) Demarcation and Management of Epidemic Areas

1. Designation of epidemic areas. Based on the results of the comprehensive assessment, when an outbreak occurs at a premises that meets good biosecurity standards, that premises may be designated as an epidemic area; when an outbreak occurs at other premises, the natural village where the affected pigs are located may be designated as an epidemic area, or a reasonably extended perimeter beyond the outbreak site may be designated as an epidemic area. In cases where an outbreak occurs during transportation or at a slaughterhouse (plant) and epidemiological investigation and assessment determine that there is no risk of further spread, an epidemic area need not be designated.

2. Measures to be taken. The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments at or above the county level in the affected area shall submit a request to their respective people’s governments to impose a lockdown on the epidemic zone. Upon receipt of such a request, the local people’s government shall issue a lockdown order in accordance with the law, organize the erection of warning signs, set up temporary inspection and disinfection stations, and carry out disinfection of all personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the area; close all pig trading venues and conduct thorough disinfection, while isolating all pigs housed therein; prohibit the introduction of live pigs into the epidemic zone and the export of live pigs and their products from the zone; allow market-ready fattened pigs that have passed inspection to be slaughtered at designated nearby slaughterhouses via designated routes; and supervise and guide farms (and individual farmers) in isolating and observing their remaining pig herds, increasing the frequency of cleaning and disinfection, and implementing vector-control measures such as fly and rodent control.

Slaughterhouses for live pigs within epidemic-affected areas shall suspend pig-slaughtering operations and conduct thorough cleaning and disinfection. Only after the local county-level people’s government department in charge of agriculture and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary medicine) has organized testing of environmental samples and samples of pig products, with all results meeting the required standards, and following a risk assessment conducted and approved by the higher-level people’s government department in charge of agriculture and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary medicine) of the county where the outbreak occurred, may production be resumed. Upon resumption of production, pig products that have passed testing, inspection, and quarantine may be sold within the administrative jurisdiction of the corresponding county.

Where an outbreak is detected within an epidemic area or African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in swine samples, the measures for handling the index case shall be applied. If, following epidemiological investigation and risk assessment, it is determined that there is no risk of disease spread, the scope of the epidemic area need not be further expanded.

(3) Delineation and Management of Threatened Areas

1. Demarcation of the threatened area. The threatened zone shall be delineated based on the results of a comprehensive assessment. In areas where no wild boar activity has been detected, the threatened zone is generally defined as extending 10 kilometers outward from the edge of the affected area; in areas with wild boar activity, the threatened zone is generally defined as extending 50 kilometers outward from the edge of the affected area.

2. Measures to be taken. The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments at or above the county level in the areas under threat shall promptly organize comprehensive inspections of all pig farms (and individual pig farmers), conduct sampling and testing when necessary, keep abreast of the epidemic situation, and strengthen prevention and control measures. The outbound movement of pigs that have not been tested and quarantined in accordance with regulations is prohibited; fattening pigs that pass inspection and quarantine may be slaughtered at nearby designated slaughterhouses along designated routes. For farms (or farmers) that have obtained an Animal Disease Prevention Compliance Certificate and whose pigs have passed the required tests, their outgoing fattening pigs may be transported on a “point-to-point” basis to qualified slaughterhouses within the same province; breeding pigs and market piglets (pigs weighing 30 kilograms or less intended for fattening) may be transported within the province.

Slaughterhouses for live pigs located within the threatened zone shall undergo thorough cleaning and disinfection; only after sampling and testing confirm compliance with relevant standards and following approval of a risk assessment conducted by the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority at the next higher level of the people’s government of the county where the threatened zone is situated may they resume production.

Where an outbreak is detected within a threatened area, or where African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in swine samples, the measures for handling the outbreak site shall be applied by analogy. If, following epidemiological investigation and risk assessment, it is determined that there is no risk of disease spread, the scope of the outbreak area and the threatened area need not be further expanded.

(4) Emergency Epidemiological Investigation

1. Preliminary investigation. Conduct searches for suspected cases in outbreak foci, epidemic areas, and threatened zones; identify the index case and determine the sequence of disease onset; investigate and assess the local geographic environment, pig farming practices, and wild boar distribution; and analyze the potential extent of epidemic spread.

2. Follow-up investigation. Conduct traceability investigations on live pigs, high-risk items, transport vehicles, and close contacts that were dispatched from the outbreak site during the period of at least 21 days prior to the onset of the index case and before isolation measures were implemented following the outbreak; collect samples from farming and slaughtering facilities (sites) with epidemiological links for testing; and assess the risk of disease spread.

3. Traceability investigation. Conduct a traceback investigation into all live pigs, high-risk items, transport vehicles, personnel movements, and the use of veterinary drugs and feed introduced into the outbreak site during the 21 days preceding the onset of the index case. Collect and test samples from relevant premises, transport vehicles, and veterinary drugs and feed that have epidemiological links, in order to determine the source of the outbreak.

When abnormalities are detected during epidemiological investigations, appropriate measures such as isolation and medical observation, as well as sample collection and testing, shall be promptly implemented based on the risk assessment.

(5) Emergency Monitoring

The agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments of the county where the outbreak has occurred and its neighboring counties shall immediately organize emergency inspections of all farming, slaughtering, quarantine, and trading facilities; intensify surveillance in key areas, critical links, and among pigs that have died abnormally; and promptly identify potential epidemic risks. They shall also increase inspection frequency at pig trading venues, slaughterhouses (abattoirs), and harmless disposal facilities, conducting targeted monitoring as appropriate. Surveillance should be strengthened at entry ports, areas surrounding transportation hubs, and zones near cargo unloading areas. Particular attention must be paid to abnormal mortality in domestic and wild pigs, and pig farms (and individual farmers) should be guided to reinforce biosecurity measures to prevent contact between farmed pigs and wild pigs. Whenever abnormalities are detected during emergency surveillance, immediate containment and observation, sample collection and testing, and other prescribed response measures must be implemented without delay.

(6) Lifting the Lockdown and Resuming Production

When all emergency response measures have been fully implemented and the following prescribed conditions are met, the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the local county-level people’s government shall apply to the higher-level agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority for organization of an acceptance inspection. Upon passing the inspection, it shall then apply to the people’s government that originally issued the lockdown order for its revocation; the latter shall issue a decree lifting the lockdown and organize the resumption of production.

1. The outbreak site is a pig farm (household), a live pig trading facility, or a quarantine facility. Within 21 days after all pigs subject to harmless treatment have been disposed of in accordance with regulations, no new outbreaks shall occur in the affected area or the threatened area; furthermore, the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authority of the people’s government at the next higher level above the county where the outbreak occurred shall organize sampling and testing of epidemiologically linked premises, including outbreak sites and slaughter, processing, and marketing establishments, and such samples shall pass inspection.

2. The outbreak site is a swine slaughterhouse (plant). After the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the next higher-level government in the county where the outbreak occurred have conducted sampling and testing of the environment and swine products and confirmed that they meet the required standards, and provided that no new cases are reported in the affected area or the threatened area within 48 hours, the lockdown shall be lifted. Upon lifting the lockdown, swine slaughter and processing enterprises may resume production; furthermore, swine products produced by swine slaughterhouses (sites) prior to the outbreak may only be sold or used for further processing after passing sampling and testing.

Following the lifting of the lockdown, live pigs quarantined at pig trading establishments within the affected area may only be sold or processed for use after passing random sampling inspections.

IV. Management of Positive Monitoring Results and Positive Test Results

(1) Monitoring of Positive Cases and Their Management

In activities such as epidemic prevention and control inspections, surveillance and screening, epidemiological investigations, and enterprise self-inspections, if African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in swine samples but the source of the samples is a farm with no reported clinical signs in its pig population or with no pigs at all, the result is classified as a surveillance-positive finding.

1. Positive monitoring results in live pig farms (households), trading establishments, and quarantine facilities

Any positive test results detected through self-inspection by production and operation entities shall be reported to the animal disease prevention and control agency at or above the county level for re-examination and confirmation. Once such self-inspection-positive results have been re-examined and confirmed, or when positive results are detected through random inspections conducted by the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at all levels, the positive pigs and all pigs in the same herd shall be culled. The remaining pigs in the herd shall be placed under 21 days of quarantine and observation. If, upon completion of the quarantine period, no abnormal morbidity or mortality is observed and nucleic acid testing of samples does not detect African swine fever virus, the pigs may be slaughtered locally or continued to be raised; however, if abnormal morbidity or mortality occurs during the quarantine period and African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected, the situation shall be handled as an outbreak.

Production and business entities that fail to report positive self-inspection and monitoring results as required or engage in falsification shall be designated as key monitoring targets. When their live pigs are ready for market, sampling must be conducted and the samples tested by a laboratory accredited by an animal disease prevention and control institution at or above the county level or by a third-party laboratory; only if no African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected may the pigs be normally marketed.

2. Positive monitoring results at slaughterhouses

When a slaughterhouse (or abattoir) detects a positive result in its self-inspection, it shall suspend pig-slaughtering operations and report the finding to the animal disease prevention and control authority at or above the county level for re-examination and confirmation. Once the self-inspection-positive result is confirmed upon re-examination, or when positive results are detected through random inspections conducted by the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary medicine) authorities at all levels, the slaughterhouse (or abattoir) where such positives were found shall be ordered to suspend pig-slaughtering operations, carry out comprehensive cleaning and disinfection, and subject the positive pigs and their products to harmless treatment. Upon completion of these measures and following satisfactory test results from sampling conducted by an animal disease prevention and control authority at or above the county level, production may be resumed. If, prior to the suspension of pig-slaughtering operations, the slaughterhouse (or abattoir) still has pigs awaiting slaughter, these pigs shall be placed under quarantine observation; during the quarantine period, if no abnormal morbidity or mortality occurs and no African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected, slaughtering may continue after production resumes; however, if abnormal morbidity or mortality occurs and African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected, the situation shall be handled in accordance with epidemic-control protocols.

When the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at all levels discover that a slaughterhouse has failed to report positive test results from monitoring, they shall order the slaughterhouse to immediately suspend slaughtering operations, conduct thorough cleaning and disinfection, and carry out harmless treatment of the positive live pigs, the pigs in the same herd, and their products. Forty-eight hours after completion of these measures, production may be resumed only upon passing sampling and testing conducted by animal disease prevention and control institutions at or above the county level. In addition, the relevant agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of people’s governments at or above the county level shall designate such slaughterhouses as key monitoring entities and increase the frequency of random inspections.

3. Positive monitoring results in the live pig transportation stage

If monitoring results are positive during the transport of live pigs, all pigs on the same transport vehicle shall be culled and disposed of in a nearby harmless manner; the transport vehicle shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected, and its origin shall be traced.

4. Investigation and Reporting of Positive Monitoring Cases

When positive results are detected through self-inspection and monitoring in the breeding, marketing, quarantine, and slaughtering stages—following confirmation by re-examination or discovery through random sampling—and when positive results are identified during the transportation of live pigs, the competent department for agriculture and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary medicine) of the local county-level people’s government shall promptly initiate an emergency epidemiological investigation. The information on positive monitoring results shall be reported, in accordance with the content and time limits stipulated for rapid reports, on a tiered basis to the China Animal Disease Prevention and Control Center; positive samples and epidemiological investigation data shall be submitted to the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center; and relevant information shall be promptly communicated to local producers and operators.

(2) Positive Test Results and Their Management

Where African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in feed and feed additives, veterinary drugs, or live pig products, such items shall be immediately sealed and stored; if assessment indicates a risk of disease transmission, the sealed feed, feed additives, veterinary drugs, and live pig products shall be destroyed. Where African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in samples from dead pigs subjected to harmless treatment, the cause of the occurrence shall be investigated and risk control measures shall be strengthened; where African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected in environmental samples from various premises, the relevant production and business entities shall also be ordered to thoroughly clean and disinfect the premises.

V. Post-Event Handling

(1) Implementing subsidies for the culling of live pigs

For live pigs subject to compulsory culling and for captive-bred wild boars that meet the eligibility criteria for subsidies, subsidy payments shall be made in accordance with relevant regulations; the funding for such culling subsidies shall be shared by the central and local governments in proportion. With regard to outbreaks detected during the transportation stage, epidemic control measures shall be undertaken by the locality where the outbreak is identified, while the culling subsidy costs shall be borne by the origin of the live pigs in accordance with applicable regulations.

(2) Conducting Post-Implementation Evaluation

Upon completion of the emergency response, the agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities at or above the county level in the area where the outbreak occurred shall organize relevant units to conduct a systematic review of the emergency response measures. This review may be combined with an assessment of the effectiveness of the response system to identify gaps and propose improvement measures, and shall be reported to the people’s government at the same level and to the higher-level agricultural and rural affairs (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities, with subsequent tiered reporting to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

(3) Commendation and Rewards

People’s governments at or above the county level and their relevant departments shall, in accordance with pertinent state regulations, commend and reward units and individuals that have made contributions to animal disease prevention work, including epidemic reporting and response; and, in accordance with applicable regulations, confer the title of martyr upon those who heroically sacrificed themselves in emergency response to epidemics.

(4) Accountability

In the course of reporting and handling epidemic-related incidents, any violations of relevant laws, regulations, and rules, as well as any unlawful or disciplinary misconduct such as dereliction of duty, negligence, or abuse of power by state functionaries, shall be rigorously investigated and held accountable in accordance with law, regulations, and Party discipline.

(5) Bereavement Benefits and Subsidies

People’s governments at all levels shall organize the relevant departments to provide appropriate subsidies or bereavement allowances, in accordance with applicable regulations, to personnel who have become ill, disabled, or died as a result of participating in emergency response operations.

VI. Safeguard Measures

People’s governments at all levels shall strengthen their leadership over local epidemic prevention and control efforts, reinforce the establishment of joint prevention and control mechanisms, ensure that relevant departments fulfill their respective responsibilities, establish standby emergency response teams for major animal epidemics, secure adequate emergency funding and supplies, and respond swiftly and take decisive, law-based measures to address outbreaks of African swine fever.

Agricultural and rural (livestock and veterinary) authorities at all levels of local people’s governments shall strengthen institutional development and capacity building, intensify public awareness campaigns on African swine fever prevention and control, establish a mechanism for epidemic surveillance that assigns responsibility for screening to specific administrative areas, villages, and farm premises, reinforce monitoring at key farms and critical links, and enhance the ability to detect and identify outbreaks at an early stage. They shall also strengthen risk management and control across all stages—breeding, slaughtering, marketing, transportation, and the harmless disposal of dead animals due to disease—and promote the effective implementation of producers’ and operators’ principal responsibilities. By adopting a comprehensive package of measures, they will effectively mitigate the risk of outbreak.

VII. Supplementary Provisions

(1) In this plan, the terms “above” and “below” as used to describe quantities shall both include the specified number.

(2) In the event of an outbreak among wild pigs, relevant control measures shall be implemented in accordance with this Plan, based on the results of epidemiological investigations and risk assessments. In accordance with the Animal Epidemic Prevention Law and other applicable laws and regulations, the forestry and grassland authorities of people’s governments at or above the county level shall be responsible for handling the situation and shall notify the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the corresponding level of people’s government, so as to prevent the spread of the wild pig epidemic to domestic pigs.

(3) In the event of an outbreak at zoos, wildlife parks, conservation breeding facilities, or facilities for the husbandry of laboratory animals, appropriate measures shall be taken in accordance with this Plan. Where necessary, based on the results of epidemiological investigations, laboratory testing, and risk assessments, the competent authorities of the provincial people’s government may be notified and, upon approval by the provincial agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) administrative department, the scope of culling may be reasonably determined.

(4) This Plan shall be interpreted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.

Attachment 1

Diagnostic Standards for African Swine Fever

I. Epidemiology 
 

(1) Source of Infection 
 

Domestic pigs, wild pigs, and soft ticks of the genus Ornithodoros are the primary sources of infection with the African swine fever virus. 
 

(2) Routes of Transmission 
 

Transmission primarily occurs through direct contact with ASFV-infected pigs or with ASFV-contaminated materials, including food waste, feed, drinking water, housing facilities, bedding, clothing, equipment, and vehicles. The gastrointestinal and respiratory tracts are the main routes of infection; transmission via bites from vector insects, such as soft ticks of the genus Ornithodoros, is also possible. The risk of aerosol-mediated transmission of ASF is very low. 
 

(3) Susceptible Animals 
 

Domestic pigs and Eurasian wild boars are highly susceptible, with no significant differences observed among breeds, ages, or sexes. In contrast, African wild pigs—such as warthogs, bush pigs, red river hogs, and giant forest hogs—rarely or never exhibit clinical signs upon infection and serve as reservoir hosts for the virus. 
 

(4) Incubation Period 
 

The incubation period varies depending on the viral strain, the host, and the route of infection, typically ranging from 5 to 19 days, with a maximum of up to 21 days.

(5) Incidence and Case Fatality Rate 
 

Pathogenicity varies among different strains: highly virulent strains can result in 100% morbidity and mortality in pigs; moderately virulent strains typically cause a mortality rate of 30% to 50%; and low-virulence strains lead to only a small number of pig deaths.

(6) Seasonality 
 

The disease does not exhibit marked seasonality; however, the risk of outbreaks is relatively higher during cold seasons in northern regions, rainy seasons in southern regions, and periods of frequent live pig transportation. 
 

II. Clinical Manifestations 
 

(1) The Most Acute 
 

Sudden death without obvious clinical symptoms. 
 

(2) Acute 
 

Body temperature may rise as high as 42°C, accompanied by depression, anorexia, and petechial hemorrhages on the skin of the ears, limbs, and abdomen; the visible mucous membranes exhibit congestion and cyanosis. Mucopurulent discharge is present from the eyes and nose; vomiting occurs; constipation develops, with blood and mucus coating the fecal surface; diarrhea ensues, with blood in the stool. Ataxia or a stiff gait may be observed, along with dyspnea; as the disease progresses, additional neurological signs such as paralysis and convulsions may appear. Pregnant sows may experience abortion. The case fatality rate can reach 100%. The clinical course typically lasts 4 to 10 days. 
 

(3) Subacute 
 

The clinical signs are the same as those of the acute form, but the disease is milder and the case fatality rate is lower. Body temperature fluctuates irregularly, typically exceeding 40.5°C. Piglets have a higher mortality rate. The duration of the illness ranges from 5 to 30 days. 
 

(4) Chronic 
 

Undulating fever, dyspnea, and wet cough. Emaciation or growth retardation, general weakness, and dull coat color. Joint swelling and skin ulcers. Low mortality rate. Disease course: 2 to 15 months.

III. Pathological Changes 
 

Pathological changes include congestion and hemorrhage of the serosal surfaces; petechial hemorrhages on the surfaces of the kidneys and lungs; extensive petechial hemorrhages in the endocardium and epicardium; diffuse mucosal hemorrhages in the stomach and intestines; hemorrhage of the gallbladder and bladder; pericardial effusion and fibrinous pericarditis; pulmonary enlargement with foamy fluid oozing from the cut surface and blood-tinged, frothy mucus in the trachea; splenomegaly with friability, ranging in color from dark red to black, with petechial hemorrhages on the surface, blunted margins, and occasionally marginal infarcts; enlarged submandibular and intra-abdominal lymph nodes, with hemorrhage or severe hemorrhage; and arthritis.

Individuals in the most acute form may exhibit no obvious pathological changes. 
 

IV. Laboratory Diagnosis 
 

The clinical signs of African swine fever are similar to those of classical swine fever, highly pathogenic porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, erysipelas, and other diseases; definitive diagnosis requires laboratory testing. The laboratory diagnostic procedures are outlined in “Diagnostic Techniques for African Swine Fever” (GB/T 18648). 
 

(1) Collection, Transportation, and Preservation of Samples 
 

Serum and etiological samples may be collected from affected animals or animals in the same herd. The packaging and transportation of these samples shall comply with the requirements set forth in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ “Packaging Standards for the Transportation of Highly Pathogenic Animal Pathogenic Microbial Strains (Viruses) or Samples,” among other relevant regulations. 
 

1. Serological samples 
 

Collect 5 mL of blood under aseptic conditions, allow it to stand at room temperature for 12–24 hours to permit serum separation, and then transport the serum under refrigerated conditions. Upon arrival at the testing laboratory, perform African swine fever antibody testing immediately or store the serum frozen for later use. 
 

2. Pathogenological Samples 
 

(1) Anticoagulated blood samples. Collect 5 mL of ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid–anticoagulated blood under sterile conditions and transport it refrigerated. Upon arrival at the testing laboratory, perform African swine fever pathogen detection immediately or freeze the samples for later use.

(2) Collect tissue samples. The spleen is the preferred sample, followed by lymph nodes, tonsils, kidneys, bone marrow, and other tissues; transport samples under refrigerated conditions. Upon arrival at the testing laboratory, perform African swine fever pathogen detection immediately or freeze and store the samples for later use. 
 

(2) Pathogen Detection 
 

Methods such as fluorescent polymerase chain reaction, isothermal nucleic acid amplification, double-antibody sandwich enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, and lateral flow immunoassays can be employed. 
 

(3) Antibody Testing 
 

Methods such as competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, indirect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, sandwich enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, and indirect immunofluorescence can be employed. 
 

V. Result Interpretation 
 

(1) Suspected Cases 
 

A pig herd is classified as a suspect case if it meets any one of the following criteria related to epidemiology, clinical signs, or postmortem lesions. 
 

1. Epidemiological criteria 
 

(1) Pigs have been vaccinated according to standard immunization protocols against classical swine fever, highly pathogenic porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, and other diseases; however, the incidence and mortality rates in the pig herd still exceed normal levels. 
 

(2) Pigs fed kitchen and catering waste exhibited abnormal illness and mortality; 
 

(3) Within 21 days after the occurrence of any potentially risky events—such as the introduction of new pigs into the herd, a change in feed, the entry of external personnel or vehicles into the pig farm, or the purchase of live pig products by farm owners or caretakers—the pig herd exhibits abnormal morbidity and mortality.

(4) Live pigs raised in the wild may come into contact with garbage or wild boars, leading to illness or death. If any one of the above four criteria is met, the case shall be deemed to meet the epidemiological criteria.

2. Clinical Symptom Criteria 
 

(1) Incidence and case-fatality rates exceeding normal ranges, or sudden death without any preceding warning signs; 
 

(2) Skin redness or cyanosis; 
 

(3) Development of high fever or conjunctivitis symptoms; 
 

(4) Joint swelling and skin ulcers; 
 

(5) Development of diarrhea or vomiting; 
 

(6) Neurological symptoms develop; 
 

(7) Sows exhibit abortion and stillbirth. 
 

If the criteria in paragraph (1) are met and any one of the other paragraphs is also met, the case shall be deemed to meet the clinical symptom criteria. 
 

3. Standards for Postmortem Lesion Examination 
 

(1) Splenomegaly; 
 

(2) Hemorrhagic infarction of the spleen; 
 

(3) Swelling or hemorrhage of the mandibular lymph nodes; 
 

(4) Abdominal lymph node enlargement or hemorrhage; 
 

(5) Arthritis; 
 

(6) Pericardial effusion, fibrinous pericarditis. 
 

Any case meeting any of the above criteria shall be deemed to meet the necropsy lesion criteria. 
 

(2) Suspected Cases 
 

Clinical suspect cases that test positive for African swine fever virus nucleic acid in laboratories of animal epidemic prevention and control institutions at or above the county level, or in third-party laboratories accredited by the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) authorities of the people’s governments at the provincial level, shall be classified as suspected cases.

(3) Confirmed Cases 
 

For suspected cases, laboratory retesting shall be conducted in accordance with relevant requirements by either the laboratory of a provincial animal disease prevention and control institution or the laboratory of a prefecture-level animal disease prevention and control institution authorized by the agricultural and rural (animal husbandry and veterinary) competent department of the provincial people’s government. If African swine fever virus nucleic acid is detected, the case shall be confirmed. 
 

(4) Differential Diagnosis of Gene-Deletion Strains 
 

For confirmed cases, provincial animal disease prevention and control agencies shall, when necessary, conduct differential diagnosis to identify gene-deleted strains; for details, refer to the “Standard for Differential Detection of Circulating Strains and Gene-Deleted Strains of African Swine Fever Virus” (No. 39 [2020] of the Office of Animal Husbandry, Ministry of Agriculture).

Attachment 2

Disinfection Standards for African Swine Fever

I. Recommended Categories of Disinfectants and Their Application Scope

Notes: 1. For sodium hydroxide and calcium hydroxide disinfectants, a 1% working concentration may be used; 2. For glutaraldehyde-based, quaternary ammonium compound-based, phenolic, and chlorine dioxide disinfectants, the working concentrations specified in the product instructions may be followed, except for drinking water disinfection, where the specified working concentration shall apply; 3. For iodine-containing, chlorine-containing, and potassium peroxymonosulfate disinfectants, the higher working concentrations indicated in the product instructions may be used. 
 

II. Disinfection of Premises and Facilities/Equipment 
 

(1) Pre-disinfection Preparation 
 

1. Thorough cleaning is required prior to disinfection to remove organic matter, dirt, feces, feed, bedding, and other contaminants. 
 

2. Select appropriate disinfectant products as needed. 
 

3. Equip with sprayers, flamethrowers, disinfection vehicles, protective equipment for disinfection personnel (such as masks, gloves, and protective boots), and disinfection containers, among other items. 
 

(2) Disinfection Methods 
 

1. Metal facilities and equipment may be disinfected by methods such as flame treatment, fumigation, and rinsing. 
 

2. Disinfection of livestock housing, vehicles, slaughter and processing facilities, storage areas, and other such premises may be carried out by washing with disinfectant solutions or by spraying. 
 

3. Feed and bedding materials at farms (or by individual farmers) may be treated by methods such as composting fermentation or incineration; manure and other waste materials, after chemical treatment, may be disposed of by deep burial, composting fermentation, or incineration. 
 

4. Disinfection of offices, dormitories, cafeterias, and other such areas may be carried out by spraying. 5. Wastewater generated during disinfection shall be rendered harmless. 
 

(3) Disinfection of Personnel and Items 
 

1. Housing and management personnel may disinfect themselves by showering and changing clothes. 
 

2. Items that may be contaminated, such as clothing, hats, and shoes, can be disinfected by soaking in a disinfectant solution or by autoclaving. 
 

(4) Disinfection Frequency 
 

The outbreak site shall be disinfected 3 to 5 times daily for 7 consecutive days, followed by daily disinfection for an additional 21 days; temporary inspection and disinfection stations in the affected area shall rigorously disinfect all vehicles and personnel entering and exiting until the lockdown is lifted.

III. Evaluation of Disinfection Efficacy 
 

Following the final disinfection, environmental samples shall be collected from metal facilities and equipment, vehicles, animal housing, slaughter and processing facilities, storage areas, as well as offices, dormitories, and canteens, and subjected to African swine fever virus nucleic acid testing. A negative nucleic acid test result indicates that the disinfection has been effective; a positive result necessitates continued cleaning and disinfection.

For animal disease testing reagents, please choose the Weiboxin brand.

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Official consultation phone numbers: 020-66377266 / 135 3988 6748, Ms. Dai

Guangzhou Weiboxin Biotechnology Co., Ltd. is located in the national-level innovation park—Guangzhou Science City—and is a provincial-level “Little Giant” high-tech enterprise specializing in the forward R&D, manufacturing, sales, and technical services of diagnostic reagents for animal epidemics. The company is also recognized as a “Contract-Honoring and Credit-Keeping Enterprise” in Guangdong Province and a provincial demonstration unit for intellectual property, as well as a industry–university–research collaboration base of Guangdong Food and Drug Vocational College and an executive director unit of the Veterinary Diagnostic and Biological Products Committee of the Guangdong Society of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine. It has been designated as an innovative, high-potential enterprise by multiple research institutes, including the Entrepreneurship College of Jinan University in Guangdong Province, and has been awarded the titles of “Specialized, Refined, Distinctive, and Innovative” enterprise at both municipal and provincial levels. The company has received the “Most Investment-Valuable Enterprise” award and the annual title of “ASF and Swine Disease Testing Service Provider.” In addition, it has obtained veterinary drug product approval numbers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: Veterinary Drug Registration No. 191438923 (Fluorescent PCR Test Kit for African Swine Fever Virus), Veterinary Drug Registration No. 191438213 (ELISA Antibody Test Kit for Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus), and Veterinary Drug Registration No. 191438875 (Blocking ELISA Antibody Test Kit for Classical Swine Fever Virus). The company was awarded the Excellence Prize in the Growth Category of the Biopharmaceutical Industry at the 11th China Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition, the Provincial Second Prize in the Growth Category of the Nanotechnology Industry Technology Competition within the Science and Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Contest, and the National Third Prize in the Growth Category of the National Finals of the Nanotechnology Industry Technology Innovation Special Competition at the China Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition. Furthermore, it has consecutively received the A-level Tax Credit Honor Certificate, the Four-Star Trademark Brand Certification, and the Two-Integration Management System Assessment Certificate each year, along with ISO 9001 International Quality Management System Certification, ISO 14001 International Environmental Management System Certification, and GMP certification from the Ministry of Agriculture. Since its establishment, the company has been granted a total of 24 patents, including 5 invention patents, 15 utility model patents, and 4 design patents, as well as more than ten trademarks.

The company boasts robust technical capabilities and a team of world-class professionals, including dozens of masters, doctors, and returnees who studied abroad, as well as numerous senior-title technical experts. Currently, the company’s primary focus is on the research and development of molecular diagnostic reagents. Its core R&D team has developed more than 600 products spanning molecular diagnostics and immunoassays, including public-health–oriented fluorescent PCR test kits, animal disease–control–oriented fluorescent PCR test kits, clinical and research–grade fluorescent quantitative PCR kits, and transgenic identification test kits (ZL2006). The company has also established a nationwide distribution network covering more than ten major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xi’an, Chongqing, Lanzhou, Zhengzhou, and Qingdao.

Looking ahead, Weiboxin will remain steadfast in its commitment to continuously enhance product quality and service standards. Leveraging a rapid and efficient research platform and abundant biomedical resources, we will conduct extensive and in-depth R&D and scientific research in the biomedical field, thereby contributing to human health and advancing life sciences. Quality is our lifeline, and innovation is our soul; we will unwaveringly uphold this philosophy as we strive to become the premier supplier of rapid diagnostic reagents and instruments.